In November of 2003, I tried to decide if the occupation of Iraq was similar to the Vietnam War. I ultimately concluded that it was not similar. I felt and still feel that the most similar parallel is the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

In the last year, many of my predictions have proven to be accurate, while a few have not. I want to take this opportunity to examine my predictions and make some new ones.

Iraq is not Vietnam – a Recap

In Vietnam, our enemy included a provisioned and organized army supported by a functioning government. There is no functioning opposition government in Iraq and the insurgents are not organized like a traditional army. They are functioning as three guerrilla armies.

Furthermore, the number of casualties in Vietnam was significantly higher.

Vietnam vs. Iraq

	1965 vs. 2003	1966 vs. 2004
Vietnam	1800	5000
Iraq	575	900 (estimated)

Iraq is Similar to Soviet Afghanistan – a Recap

The USSR invaded and occupied Afghanistan in only a few weeks at the end of 1979. They promptly did the following things:

• Installed an interim government.
• Created a new Afghani army and police force.
• Held elections.
• Used the newly trained Afghani forces as proxies to fight the insurgents.

Troop levels and casualty rates are similar for Soviet Afghanistan and American Iraq.

Afghanistan vs. Iraq

1st Year	Afghanistan 1980	Iraq 3/2003 – 2/2004	2nd year	Afghanistan 1981	Iraq 3/2004 – 2/2005
Population	13 million	25 million	Population	13 million	25 million
Troops	80,000	131,000	Troops	80,000	150,000
Deaths	1484	650	Deaths	1298	1000 (estimated)

My Previous Predictions

2003 American Casualties — Correct

On 11 November 2003, I predicted that total American casualties for 2003 would be around 600. The actual number was 575. This was not a very difficult prediction; I had 8 months of data to predict less than two months of combat.

Drop in American Troop Levels — Incorrect

I originally accepted the idea that the American government would lower troop levels to 100,000 in early 2004. I could have questioned this intention, but I did not. We have instead slowly increased troop levels to about 150,000.

I do not think that lower troop levels would have changed the casualty rate much.

American Casualties in the First 12 Months — Incorrect

I overestimated the number of casualties in the first 12 months of war. I predicted 800 and the actual number was 650. I am very happy that it was lower.

Iraqi Citizen Casualties — Unknown

I felt that if we kept our current occupation plan, then 50,000 to 100,000 Iraqi citizens would die over five to seven years. This might be accurate or very low. One website tracks the number of Iraqi civilians killed as reported by the press. Using their numbers, my prediction is probably accurate. On the other hand, the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health recently released a study that indicated that 100,000 Iraqis may have already died as a result of American actions.

Using Iraqi Forces as Battle Proxies – Correct

I predicted that we would attempt to use Iraqi police and the Iraqi army as often as possible. We are currently using them in most operations. However, we do not use them as heavy armor, artillery, or air support.

Three Iraqi Insurgent Groups — Correct

I predicted that the insurgency would be organized into three general groups — Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites. This is certainly the case, but the media does not often make the distinction when reporting attacks and counter-insurgency operations.

No Democracy in Iraqi — Correct

I pointed out that it is impossible to force another country to adopt democracy in a short period of time. Donald Rumsfeld has admitted that fully democratic elections in Iraqi are unlikely. He expressed that holding elections in three-fourths of the country would certainly be good enough.

Possible Future Scenarios

Last year, I predicted that our present course would lead to 5000 to 7000 American dead before withdrawing in six to seven years. I also evaluated two radical solutions. The current administration will not likely choose to withdraw completely in the next few months or deploy 1 million troops to Iraq. Instead of discussing highly unlikely scenarios such as these, I am going to present some scenarios that are more likely.

Status Quo

Mounted troops troops that are performing their operations from a vehicle. Strictly, this refers to troops in tanks, hummers, Bradley fighting vehicles, jeeps with mounted machine guns, or other ground based vehicles. The term is often expanded to include helicopters. We do not include airplanes, troop transports, or cargo trucks. Dismounted troops troops that are performing their combat functions on the ground rather than from a vehicle. Note that if you have six soldiers in a hummer and they engage the enemy without using the vehicle tactically, then we consider them dismounted. Light infantry Before World War I, it was fairly easy to define light infantry. These troops were rarely transported by vehicle and used lighter weapons and armor. They were often the fastest dismounted troops and were effective in urban settings and for holding positions. In modern warfare, units are highly integrated. Meaning, most units have multiple vehicles, artillery, and air support at their disposal. I use this term to mean troops that have a relatively low number of combat vehicles and that tactically rely on dismounted troops for combat operations. Heavy armor This primarily refers to tanks. Heavy armor is noted for its high-power weapons, thick defensive armor, and slow speed (relative to light armor). We sometimes refer to heavy armor as heavy cavalry. Light armor This primarily refers to lighter vehicles specifically designed for combat operations. We note that light armor have smaller weapons, lighter defensive armor, and faster speed (relative to heavy armor). We often expand the term to include armored hummers. We sometimes refer to light armor as light cavalry. Fixed-wing aircraft Airplanes. Airplanes include a huge range of vehicles, but relative to rotary-wing crafts, they have some major features. They are generally faster with much more powerful weapons or a higher cargo capacity. Airplanes are limited in their ability for sustained engagement with ground forces and their ability to deploy/redeploy ground forces. Rotary-wing aircraft Helicopters. Generally, they have less powerful weapons than airplanes, but they have the ability to close with ground forces for an extended engagement and to be more discriminate in their attacks. They can also deploy/redeploy ground forces in a wider range of situations. Air strikes Any attack from an aircraft. We primarily use this term to refer to missiles, rockets, and bombs delivered from airplanes. Helicopters tend to have a smaller payload and therefore are inefficient at delivering a large enough attack to be called an air strike. Artillery Large, mobile guns and rockets that attack positions and troops from a distance. This term often includes anti-aircraft guns. Artillery is noted for its mobility (relative to a missile), long-range (relative to a hand-held weapon), and firepower. They are especially useful when attacking fortified positions. It is relatively easy to deliver multiple rounds to a very small area. Many types of artillery are effective against concentrated ground troops. Flanking a military tactic were you attack your enemy unexpectedly from the side. For a simple example, think of ten soldiers on a mountain lined up behind some rocks and they believe that their enemy is in front of them. If their enemy were to attack from the front, then all ten soldiers could fire at them. On the other hand, if the enemy attacked from the side (their flank), then only one or two soldiers could fire at the enemy. The soldiers at the end of the line block the line-of-sight of the rest of the soldiers. Attacking these same ten soldiers from behind is not flanking. First, all ten soldiers can turn and shoot at the enemy; second, the soldiers can often take cover on the other side of the rock.

The most likely scenario is more of the same. I feel that this means American troop levels will stay between 120,000 and 170,000. We will try to train more Iraqis to perform basic police functions, intelligence gathering, and light infantry functions (patrolling, simple reconnaissance, basic security, etc.).

This choice is politically easy to make and logistically simple to implement. However, it is still foolhardy.

The raw number of troops in Iraq does not expose the entire problem with our current troop deployment plan. We are currently using a large number of air strikes, artillery, and heavy armor in Iraq. In the November 2004 attack on Fallujah, we first pounded the city with artillery and air strikes. This type of operation has been standard practice for at least 60 years. It is highly effective against fortified positions and regular armies.

However, the insurgents do not have fortified positions and they are not organized as a regular army. I have read at least two reports from American commanders analyzing Soviet operations in Afghanistan (PDF) that criticize this type of operation. Like the Americans in Iraq, the Soviets were able to overrun the entire country in a number of weeks using conventional tactics, but they were not able to fight the insurgents using the same tactics. In my opinion, the major lesson we should learn from the Soviet occupation strategy of Afghanistan is that artillery, heavy armor, and air strikes are not effective against guerrilla armies. The only way to successfully engage a guerrilla army is with light troops that frequently dismount to locate, chase, capture, and destroy the enemy.

You may have seen the television show called COPS. In each episode, police officers routinely leave their vehicle (dismount) to catch the bad guys. This is very similar to counter-insurgency operations.

For example, an effective way of finding the insurgents in an urban area is to bring dismounted light infantry to the area to be searched. The troops move from block to block looking for the bad guys. When they find them, they engage them. Right now, we depend too much on mounted troops for these urban operations. We deploy multiple light armor vehicles and ride through the city. This is ineffective for two reasons. First, the insurgents rarely have to engage directly. The insurgents merely have to setup mines and wait for a patrol to come along. Second, if fighting does happen, our troops are essentially tied to the vehicles for communications and supplies. The limited mobility of our troops allows the insurgents to flank us or escape.

For the insurgents to be successful they must attack encampments, troop movements, and supply movements when they are the most vulnerable. In Soviet Afghanistan, the insurgents would often strike convoys. An especially effective tactic was to setup a mine in a rural road or block the road with rocks. The insurgents would take up positions on both sides of the road and wait for the convoy. At the mine explosion or the roadblock, the entire convoy would come to a stop. The insurgents would then attack with small arms, rockets, and grenades. If the insurgents were successful in overwhelming the convoy, then they would take weapons and supplies from the convoy and leave. Very often though, the insurgent force was too small to overpower the heavy and light armor of the convoy. This may sound like a success for the convoy, but it is not. The soviets rarely dismounted their troops and chased the insurgents. Since the Soviets did not chase the guerrilla s, they rarely inflicted casualties or caught any of them. fre, the insurgents were able to perform numerous attacks with minimal loses.

The common analysis is that the Soviets needed to dismount their troops and chase the insurgents. At the same time, they should have deployed helicopters with additional light infantry to the area. The combination of the helicopters, light infantry, and reinforcements would have allowed the Soviets to inflict heavy casualties on the insurgents. In the few cases where the Soviets did this (often spontaneously), it was highly effective.

Another mistake the Soviets made in Afghanistan is using a large number of Afghanis in combat operations. It was impossible to hire only Afghanis that would remain loyal to the Soviets and the Soviet-backed government. Afghani soldiers defecting to the insurgency was common. We have already seen similar situations in Iraq.

The Afghani insurgency was also able to learn about troop and supply movements from their contacts inside the Afghani army. It is obvious that the various Iraqi insurgent groups will also be able to gather intelligence about American operations from Iraqis that are employed by the American army.

To summarize, we are emulating many Soviet mistakes:

• Overuse of Iraqi troops
• Overuse of artillery, heavy armor, and fixed-wing aircraft
• Under-use of dismounted troops in combat operations

I think we will continue with this strategy. I project that we will stay in Iraq for five to six more years with total American losses between fix and six thousand. The current data on Iraqi losses is unreliable. I certainly believe that the number of Iraqi casualties will stay the same over the time of the occupation. If the accounts in the press are accurate, then I project 60,000 to 90,000 Iraqi dead. If the Johns Hopkins study is correct, then I project 400,000 to 500,000 Iraqi dead. If the Johns Hopkins study is correct, then I hope we discover this soon and make a dramatic change for the better. The idea of killing half a million people to depose a contained dictator is appalling.

Lowering Troops Levels

The second most likely scenario is that we will drop troop level to somewhere between 70,000 and 110,000. For better or for worse, the media and public seem to focus on two things in Iraq: how many troops are on the ground and how many Americans are killed. As we have already established, the type of troops and the tactics used by those troops is at least as important as the sheer number of troops. In the scenarios where we lower the number of troops, I do not think we will improve the percentage of light infantry or increase the use of dismounted tactics. This scenario may cost less monetarily, but is no more advantageous otherwise.

If we drop the troop levels, we will have to change our strategic objectives. I think that we will focus on securing American Command-and-Control (the Green Zone in Baghdad), the Baghdad Airport, some forward bases throughout the country, some major pipelines, and the roads that link our forces together. This means we will rarely perform counter-insurgency operations like the Fallujah assault in November 2004.

Some parts of the country will be run by the government out of Baghdad, but most areas will be ruled by a local leader or group. The best parallel to this is the current situation in Afghanistan. The government that recently held elections and is headed by Hamid Karzai is really only controlling the central part of the country immediately surrounding the capital city. The rest of the country is run by local warlords.

With logistical and economic support from the US, Baghdad will be able to control more of the country than the Afghanis currently control. I think that the country will be divided into three different sections.

The Kurdish north has been, and will remain, largely autonomous in this scenario. They are fairly stable and if we drop troop levels we will withdraw most of our troops from this region. There will be few attacks and this will remain the most stable area of the country.

The Shiite south will begin to congeal into a cohesive stable government run by the Ayatollahs. After a troop reduction, this area will have some fighting as the different clerics fight for control. I predict this will be short lived. This area will remain stable until the Baghdad government gets control of the central part of the country. They will then turn their attention to the Ayatollahs. At this point, it is difficult to predict what will happen. If there are capable diplomats and leaders on all three sides (American, Baghdad, and the Ayatollahs), then there could be a peaceful and smooth transition to a power-sharing government. This would be something of a hybrid between a republic, a theocracy, and a confederacy.

However, if we had skilled diplomats in Iraq and America, then we would not be in a war to begin with. The more likely scenario is that once Baghdad consolidates their power in the central part of the country, they will begin to force their police and army into the Shiite south. This will function exactly as Iraq did under Saddam Hussein. Since I think it would take at least eighteen months to consolidate power, the Shiites will have ample time to arm and train. When Baghdad starts to march south, this will be a full-on civil war. We should expect two to three years of fighting with 40,000 – 250,000 Iraqis dead.

As I alluded to before, I think that immediately after a troop reduction, the Baghdad government will have to focus on the areas in the central part of the country. Various warlords in different cities (Fallujah, Tikrit, etc.) can currently move and act with impunity. Baghdad will have to neutralize these different groups and bring each city under their control. This will take time and soldiers to accomplish. I guess that it will take between eighteen and thirty-six months to completely subdue the central part of the country. Between two and ten thousand Iraqis may die during that time.

So what about American casualties in this scenario? I don—t think they will change dramatically. Our major casualties do not come from counter-insurgency operations. I think that the casualty rate will be virtually the same in the scenario as the previous scenario – 5000 to 7000 Americans dead over the next five to six years.

Troop levels raise dramatically to 270,000 +/- 60,000

The least likely scenario involves dramatically increasing the number of troops over the next eighteen months. If there is a large troop increase I would place the number of troops between 210,000 and 330,000.

If the administration increased to this type of troop strength, then I think that two things will force them to start using better tactics. One, to get this many troops on the ground in that short of a time, we will have to retrain many troops for new duties. The easiest combat role to train for is light, dismounted infantry. You give Joe a gun and you teach him how to march; it—s that easy! Two, the logistics involved and the cost associated with deploying heavy armor and artillery will limit the amount of that type of equipment that we deploy. Therefore, either by accident or by design, the proportion of light infantry will increase. Furthermore, the use of dismounted tactics will increase. Both are good for military success.

On the other hand, increased troop strength will increase enemy engagements. American casualties will go up, especially in the short term. If troop levels go this high, I predict that we lose 14,000 to 16,000 over the next eight to nine years. A large percentage of those loses will come in the first four years.

Many people think that it is not possible to get that many more troops without a draft; I disagree. There are four main ways to double the troops in Iraq without a draft.

1. Replace military personal with civilians. Halliburton and other logistics companies are already performing many functions for our army. Think about it, do you really need a soldier to drive a tank of gas from point A to point B? We again turn to our learned colleague – Donald Rumsfeld. He pointed out that there are up to 380,000 military personnel that we could easily replace with civilians. We hire civilians to replace cooks, drivers, and dry cleaners. We then retrain those military personnel for light infantry duties.
2. According to the 2003 data, we have 100,000 Army soldiers (not including the other branches – just US Army) forces deployed outside of the United States and not in Iraq or related operations (like Kuwait). We don—t really need 60,000 Americans in Europe or 40,000 Americans in Korea anymore. We could easily retrain and redeploy many of those soldiers to Iraq.
3. Congress could decide to spend more money on recruitment and pay for soldiers. Right now, the normal pay rates are low enough for some soldiers that we had to pass a law in 2001 that created a new program for military personnel that qualified for food stamps! The Family Member Supplemental Subsistence Allowance (FSSA) is a band-aid for the larger problem that we underpay our soldiers. One way to increase recruitment is to improve pay and benefits.
4. Finally, we have over 230,000 reserves that we can call up.

No Peace and No Democracy

As you can see, there are no realistic scenarios that lead to peace or democracy in Iraq.